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THE SWORD AND THE SHIELD: RLUIPA
AND THE NEW BATTLE GROUND

OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Kevin M. Powers*
ABSTRACT

RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., was enacted in
September of 2000 to provide a new level of protection for
religious exercise and religious adherents. Specifically, it was
tailored to prevent churches and religious institutions from being
placed on unequal footing when compared to non-religious groups
in zoning decisions. RLUIPA was extended to protect prisoners as
well. In this context, RLUIPA was designed to allow incarcerated
people the opportunity to practice their religion freely, by giving
these prisoners protections they would not otherwise be accorded.
Both the zoning and prisoner elements of RLUIPA have
faced substantial attacks in the court systems. The rulings
stemming from the two areas, however, have been vastly different.
Courts ruling on RLUIPA zoning cases have generally upheld the
constitutionality of the statute, while those courts dealing with
prison litigation have split on RLUIPA's authority. As a result of
these divergent decisions, the case law surrounding RLUIPA
varies greatly depending upon which issue is being tried. Prisoner
cases largely deal with the extra rights and levels of scrutiny that
are given to prisoners, while zoning cases tend to focus on whether
there is evidence of a substantial burden on free exercise.
The most obvious area in which the general public feels
RLUIPA's impact though, is in the local zoning battles that have
erupted since 2000. In these battles, neighbors are pitted against
neighbors, neighborhoods are pitted against parishioners, and cities
are pitted against churches. How did a situation arise in which
local communities are torn apart? In this note I will explain how
RLUIPA's zoning context was developed, how implementation of
RLUIPA necessarily divides communities, and how the courts
have continually upheld RLUIPA's zoning clauses, thus greatly
expanding the rights of religious practitioners.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"We have seen our BB gun replaced by an atomic bomb. ,
On September 22, 2000, in what may become his most
important piece of legislation, then-President Clinton signed into

law the awkwardly titled Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq (hereinafter
"RLUIPA"). Since that time, this little-publicized law has begun
to work its way through the nation's court system. In short,
RLUIPA provides a vehicle for religious institutions to challenge
adverse zoning laws, and preempt zoning decisions. At almost
every level, be it state versus federal, or trial versus appeal, the
courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA, and

have thus created a potent weapon in the quiver of religious
groups. Whereas it was initially designed as a tool for churches to
obtain equal footing in zoning disputes RLUIPA has been4

3 new religions,
stretched to include household prayer meetings,
6
5
wedding chapels, and religious retreats.
All that a church or religious institution needs to

demonstrate, is that a zoning decision places a substantial burden
upon the institution's right to free exercise of religion.7 Once a
*

2

4
5

6
7

J.D. Candidate at the Regent University School of Law (B.A. - University
of Memphis, M.A. - University of Memphis). I would like to thank Jessica
Powers and John Stepanovich for their ideas and support in this article.
James L. Dam, Churches Use New Federal Statute to Win Zoning Cases,
LAWYERS
WEEKLY USA,
August
20,
2001,
available at
http://www.lawyersweekly.com/ (last accessed June 27, 2003) [hereinafter
"Dam Report"] (quoting Brad Dacus, President of the Pacific Justice
Institute ("PJI") in Sacramento, California). The PJI represents religious
groups in RLUIPA discrimination cases. Id. Mr. Dacus was referring to the
powerful legal tool that RLUIPA can be for litigants. Id.
For the full-text of the legislation and its history please see
http://www.rluipa.com,
or
access
the
act
directly
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106 congpublic laws&docid=f:publ274.106.
Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D.Conn. 2001).
Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township, 309 F.3d 120 (3rd. Cir.
2002).
Kaahumanu v. Maui, 315 F.3d 1215 ( 9th Cir. 2003).
DiLaura v. Ann Arbor, 30 Fed.Appx. 501 ( th Cir. 2002).
6
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2003).
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prima facie case of burden is made, the law shifts the burden of
persuasion to the government to show that they are imposing this8
interest.
burden pursuant to a compelling governmental
Furthermore, even if the government proves that they have a
are imposing
compelling interest, they must then show that they
9
possible.
means
restrictive
this burden in the least
RLUIPA does more than simply allow a church to bypass a
zoning board; it also allows institutionalized persons, i.e.,
1°
prisoners, to have their religious beliefs vindicated in court.
Whereas a typical prisoner's civil rights are restricted when
incarcerated, RLUIPA eviscerates the restrictions and allows
prisoners to engage in practices that are consistent with their
religious beliefs, regardless of whether a prison system has long1
This
banned a religious practice in view of safety concerns.
leaves practitioners with the obvious question of how and why did
this law become such a powerful tool?
In this note, I will explain the evolution of RLUIPA. In the
first part of the note, I will clarify how this legislation came to be
enacted. In the second part, I will delve further into the actual
provisions of RLUIPA, as it pertains to zoning enforcement.
Breaking down the major components of RLUIPA will
demonstrate what is required of both institutions and the
government under the current statutory and case law. Following
this, I will break down RLUIPA claims into their typical scenarios.
I conclude by contrasting RLUIPA's recent zoning decisions with
an RLUIPA prisoner case, Madison v. Riter. Madison held
RLUIPA unconstitutional at the district level and is illustrative of
battles to come.12

8 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A) (2003).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(B) (2003).
'0 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2003).

9

"
12

Such as specific diets, beards, hats, or worship styles. See generally Madison
v. Riter, 240 F.Supp.2d 566 (4 th Cir. 2003).
Id.

148
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CONSTITUTIONALITY

RLUIPA, Congress's first attempt to protect religious
13
groups since the Religious Freedom Restoration Act , was enacted
to counteract the unchecked authority that zoning boards and
municipalities had been wielding over churches and other religious
institutions. Often times religious groups were denied equal access
to appropriately zoned areas simply because a neighborhood did
not like the people,' 4 the ideas,' 5 or the religion. 16 New religions,
religious groups, and their followers were continually denied
permits, and were often harassed. 17 Recognizing that the patterns
of discrimination were contradictory to our nation's founding
principles, Congress stepped into the fray in an attempt to curtail
the religious discrimination.' 8 In discussing the history of the law,
I will first discuss the background of RLUIPA's previous
iterations. Next, I will show the patterns of discrimination that
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4 (2000).
14 Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570 ( 2 1d Cir.
2002), motion denied, No. 02-7073, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3898. This is
most prevalent in church ministries that provide support for homeless
people. Id.
15 For instance, in Dunamis Cmty. and Outreach Ministries v. Volusia County,
(M.D.Fl. 2001), Case No. 6:01-CV-643-ORL-28-DAB (2001), a region of
new-age spiritualists did not want a Christian church relocating in their area
at
available
ideas,
of
conflict
the
of
because
http://www.rluipa.com/cases/DunamisComplaint.pdf (last accessed June 30,
2003).
16 Islamic Ctr. of Miss. v. City of Starkville, 840 F. 2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988).
Here, zoning codes were struck down that had prohibited churches in
specific areas unless the people could drive to the sanctuary. Id The zoning
laws were enacted to prohibit Muslims from locating in a traditionally
Judeo-Christian area. Id.
17 146 CONG. REC. H7190-91 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Cong.
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgiat
available
Canady),
=
(last
106_congreports&docid=f:hr219.106.pdf
bin!getdoc.cgi?dbname
accessed June 30, 2003 [hereinafter "Canady Statement"].
cognizant of
IS "[W]hen entering the area of religious freedom, we must be fully
the particular protection that the Constitution has accorded it. Abhorrence of
religious persecution and intolerance is a basic part of our heritage."
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 US. 599, 606 (1961).
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Congress felt needed changing. Finally, I will show why RLUIPA
is constitutionally sound.
A. The Tug of War Between Congress and
the Court
To understand RLUIPA, you must first understand the long
history of conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court
regarding the Act's formation. RLUIPA's legislative history
shows that this law was necessary to counteract the unbounded
autonomy that, following the wake of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, local zoning boards had wielded in recent years.
Until the enactment of RLUIPA, Congress and the Court had been
involved in an increasingly acrimonious arm-wrestling match over
the proper authority of the Court and Congress. From Congress's
perspective, the Court was continually stripping away fundamental
19
rights through decisions such as Employment Division v. Smith
and Sherbert v. Verner.20 From the Court's perspective, Congress
was continually stepping outside their constitutionally delineated
21
authority and trying to define what the Bill of Rights meant.
For some time, Congress was alarmed at the patterns of
discrimination that were being exhibited against religious groups
by governmental and quasi-governmental authorities. Religious
organizations were continually and systematically discriminated
against. 22 The patterns of discrimination had been on the rise but
23
increased sharply in 1990 with Employment Division. v. Smith.
24
The Court had earlier ruled, in Sherbert v. Verner, that
'9 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

20

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

21

City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997):

Congress' power under § 5, however, extends only to "enforcing" the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described this

22

23
24

power as "remedial," ... The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States.
146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
at
available
Kennedy),
Sen.
&
Hatch
accessed
(last
http://www.rluipa.com/generaldocs/SenateLegisHistory.html
July 1, 2003) [Hereinafter "Joint Statement"].
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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government actions substantially burdening a religious practice
25
had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest. But
Smith changed the judicial landscape. Dejure discrimination was
effectively given the Supreme Court's blessing when they held in
Smith that even a law substantially burdening the free exercise of
religion is not unconstitutional as long as it is neutral and of
general applicability. 26 The Court in Smith further held that if the
law was neutral and of general application27 then a compelling
Interestingly for
governmental interest need not be shown.
a
RLUIPA's drafters, the Court did maintain that law that utilizes
individualized assessments in application requires strict scrutiny
analysis whenever questioned in court.28
B. What Discrimination?
Examples of local government intrusions upon religious
freedom include: the prohibition against a Jewish student's
wearing of a yarmulke to school, 29 a local athletic association's
refusal to allow Jewish students to play basketball while wearing
their yarmulkes, 30 government-assisted nursing homes' refusal to
allow religiously affiliated people to volunteer their time to care
for their elderly parents31 , and municipalities enacting legislation
that placed restrictions on when and where people could preach
32
In one case, involving an Orthodox Jewish Rabbi
their faith.
being threatened with criminal prosecution for holding religious
26

494 U.S. at 883.
Id. at 884.

27

Id.

25

28

29

30

31
12

Id. ("[O]ur decisions ... stand for the proposition that where the State has in
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that
system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason.").
Issues Relating to Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the
Constitutionality of a Religious Protection Measure: Hearings before the
h
Comm. On the Judiciary, 106" Cong., 88 (1999) (testimony of Prof. Douglas
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgiat
available
Laycock),
(last
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 106 senatehearings&docid=f:67066.pdf
accessed June 30, 2003) [hereinafter "Laycock Testimony"].

id.

Greater New York Health Care Facilities v. Axelrod, 770 F. Supp. 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Laycock Testimony, supra note 29.
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services in his home, the Court of Appeals stated that "the city's
interest in an exception-free zoning plan outweighed the rabbi's
33
interest because the services are not integral to his faith." It was
these examples of discrimination, which put other interests above
First Amendment rights, that Congress was alarmed at and sought
to remedy.
The patterns of animosity were especially prevalent at
zoning board hearings. For example, at one zoning board hearing,
a person opposing a Jewish synagogue in his neighborhood turned
to the Jewish people in the audience and exclaimed, "Hitler should
have killed more of you."' 34 Clearly local governments viewed
their "generally applicable" laws as more compelling than the
protection of fundamental Constitutional rights. In another nonzoning case, the 1st Circuit rejected a Free Exercise claim brought
by parents of a student. The claim was filed after the student was
forced to participate in the school's "Hot, Sexy, and Safer
Productions." As part of this presentation the students simulated
masturbation, used profanity (even telling one minor he had a
"nice butt,") and referred to anal sex.35
The decisions of the Court in Smith had emboldened
municipal governments and local leaders that when it came to
zoning laws, they could rule with impunity. This autonomy was
buttressed by the Court's traditional deference to local zoning
laws. Federal courts grant wide deference to the land use decisions
of local governments, realizing that local governments know the
needs of their areas better. 36 Under the Supreme Court's model,
local governments were allowed wide latitude in decision-making.

33

14

35
36

The Need for Federal Protection of Religious Freedom After Boerne v.
Flores II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement of Steve
McFarland, Director of Center for Law and Religious Freedom) (quoting
Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983)), availableat
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/222355.htm (last accessed June 30, 2003).
Laycock Testimony, supra note 28.
Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township, 309 F.3d 120, 125 (3rd. Cir.
2002); Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Rochester, No. 98-CV-0715, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4844, at *77 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
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C. Supreme Court Zoning Decisions
Traditionally, a zoning ordinance could only be challenged
(successfully) under 1 4 th Amendment Equal Protection and Due
Process claims. However, even these victories, when they did
occur, were Pyrrhic 37 as the Court would usually reinforce the
notion of local autonomy.38 Therefore, in an era of zoning
autonomy and religious discrimination it became harder and harder
39
for religious people to use their own land as they saw fit. "If the
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control., 40 As the Court later stated "[t]he ...power," to regulate
zoning "is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and
unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people." 41 The Court will "generally
sustain [zoning] legislation unless it is not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. 42
D. The Courts Only Helped the Cities
Not only were the local towns and cities acting
discriminately toward religious institutions but the courts were as
well. In Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. Daytona Beach, the local
government denied a conditional use permit to the Daytona Rescue
Mission who desired to use their property as a homeless shelter.
The court, in siding with the city, said that the prohibitions upon
the Mission's religion did not constitute a substantial burden. The
Court effectively decided what qualifies as sufficiently religious
'7

38

"A new...hearing on damages would leave Chevron in the position of
Pyrrhus, whose victories over the Roman army were achieved at excessive
cost. Like Pyrrhus, Chevron would have cause to complain: 'One more such
victory and I am lost."' Chevron Chem. Co. v. DeLoitte & Touche, 557
N.W.2d 775, 778 (Wis. 1997).
Id.

39 Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
40 Id. at 4.
41 Id.at 9.
42 Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township, 161 F.Supp.2d 432, 436
(E.D.Pa.2001).
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practices to warrant state protection. 43 The Court ruled that
"[a]lthough [plaintiffs] argue that housing the homeless and
feeding the poor are central to their religion, the court finds that the
44 In
burden on religion is at the lower end of the spectrum."
another instance, a judge stated that, "[w]e don't want any twelve
story prayer towers in Rockford," when referring to a church with
a loose affiliation with Oral Roberts University.
Courts were engaging in theological decisions (and
derisions) that were well beyond their purview. "It is no business
of the courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for
one group is not religion under the protection of the First
Amendment. 46 On their face, zoning laws are neutral and applied
to all people. Consequently, courts were repeatedly siding with the
municipalities over religious institutions. The inequitable ruling in
Daytona Rescue Mission went against the wealth of Supreme
Court jurisprudence that held "[t]he loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury."4 7 The choice in the courts was
whether to vindicate the rights of one religious group, or pull back
the autonomy municipalities had been granted to govern their own
affairs.

4'

885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D.Fl. 1995); see also First Assembly of God v. Collier
County., 20 F.3d 419, 424 (11th Cir. 1994) (reflecting the same contrary
view).

44
45

885 F. Supp at 1558.
Canady Statement, supra note 17. Congressman Canady's statement also
cites an example of where "[a]nother witness discussed a case involving the
application for a permit by the Family Christian Center ... a neighbor
implored, "Let's keep these God damned Pentecostals out of here." Id.
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953).
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

46

47
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E. Congress Decides To Act
As a result of the increase in discrimination, Congress
4
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ' (RFRA).
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Supreme Court's
49
decision in Employment Div. v. Smith that held "the First
Amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion did not
extend to religious exercise that is burdened by a neutral law of
50
RFRA was enacted to restore legal
general applicability.
protection for religious exercise by requiring all free exercise
51
The intended
claims to be examined under strict scrutiny.
from
government
prohibit
outcome of this legislation was to
imposing any substantial burden upon any person's free exercise of
religion, unless the burden is in pursuit of a compelling
governmental interest, and is achieved by the least restrictive
52
means in furthering that interest. Because of the omnibus nature
of the law many groups fell underneath RFRA's protection and
used it as both a sword and shield to protect their rights.
RFRA was broad and was not narrowly tailored to any
specific group. Partly due to the breadth of its scope, the portions
of RFRA that applied to the states were struck down by the
3
law
Supreme Court in Boerne v. Flores.5 The court stated that the
54 The
was over-broad and sought to protect undocumented harms.
Court further held that while Congress has the power to enforce the
Constitution legislatively, Congress can only act to remedy past
violations, not to prohibit speculative harms that have yet to be
demonstrated.55 Although only the portions of Boerne applying to

48 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(1)-(4) (1993).
49 Judiciary to Consider Religious Liberty Protection Act - Measure will

Restore Balance in Free Exercise Law: Before the House Comm. On the
Judiciary, 106 th Cong. (1999) (brief of Cong. Henry Hyde), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/rlpaib.htm (last accessed June 25, 2003)
[hereinafter "Hyde Statement"].
50

id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

" 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
54

55

Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
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the states were stricken, the law lost most of its teeth as a result of
this ruling.
F. Congress Decides to Act ... Again

It was at this point that Congress stepped in to protect
religious freedom ... again. RLUIPA is Congress's latest attempt

to divine what the Supreme Court will allow. Congress couched
its legislation in numerous constitutional provisions, including the
First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce
Clause, and the Spending Clause. 56 They made the law extremely
specific to ensure the law was narrowly tailored, following the
holding in Employment Div. v. Smith.5 7 Finally, Congress
documented national patterns of discrimination, in order to
58
overcome any constitutional challenges.
With regard to constitutional provisions, RLUIPA includes
a number of specific circumstances in which will be applicable. In
order for the claim to be ripe the action must be based upon an
individualized land use assessment, the activity must affect
interstate commerce, or the program that is discriminating must
receive federal funding. 59 These provisions put the law squarely
and set RLUIPA in
within the commerce and spending clauses,
6
0
cases.
Court
line with earlier Supreme
RLUIPA was enacted because Congress found that
churches were "frequently discriminated against" when zoning
codes would exclude churches in areas where other large secular
groups were allowed to meet. 6 1 RLUIPA was passed after months
of hearings that documented the discrimination Congress knew
was so prevalent. The bill was so well received it passed the
By its design RLUIPA is
Senate by unanimous consent.
56
5'
5'
59
60
61
62

Hyde Statement, supra note 49.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Hyde Statement, supra note 49.
42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a)(2) (2000).
Hyde Statement, supra note 49.
Joint Statement, supra note 22.
Pub. L. No. 106-274, A Bill to Protect Religious Liberty, and For Other
Purposes: Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, S.2869
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi2000),
22,
(September
bin/bdquery/z?d106:SN02869:@@@X (last accessed June 24, 2003).
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significantly narrower than RFRA, but it provides many of the
same protections.
G. Zoning Discrimination
Examples of the discrimination in zoning are legion.
Congress found that businesses and local secular groups could
bring theaters, health clubs, and community centers as of right,
whereas a church had to apply for a special use permit or were
63
simply excluded from the area altogether. In another instance, a
Catholic hospital was denied government accreditation when the
board refused to instruct their students on the performance of
abortions. 64 In Colorado, Arapahoe County officials enforced
numerical restrictions on the number of students that could be
enrolled in religious schools, while Douglas County regulated the
°5 The
number of persons in congregations of various churches.
same patterns were exhibited in colleges and universities
nationwide. Religious student groups were typically denied access
to campus ministry space if the groups required that people share
their religious beliefs. Even worse, many universities simply
denied religious groups the ability to form altogether if the
66
In New York, a
organization based its leadership on religion.
school district would permit secular community groups to rent
school facilities on weekends, but deny religious-oriented
community groups the opportunity to rent the facilities for
religious purposes. 67 These are but a few examples of the many
instances Congress documented.
RLUIPA was drafted in the wake of this rampant
discrimination. By utilizing RLUIPA in a claim, a religious68
over an authority.
institution can wield the Sword of Damocles
An RLUIPA claim can keep a municipality from following its own
desires by prohibiting governmental discrimination that places a
63
64
65
66
67
68

Canady Statement, supra note 17.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 150 (2003) ("Like the Sword of
Damocles, he knows it is there, but not whether or when it will fall.").
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substantial burden on religious exercise. 69 Furthermore, the law
shifts the burden of persuasion onto the municipality once a
substantial burden is shown. 70 As a result, a religious institution
can recover compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and still get
the change that they want. Combining Congress' narrow drafting
of RLUIPA with documented patterns of discrimination, and
grounding the law in the Commerce Clause obviates most of the
need for judicial review. Since the majority of cases have upheld
RLUIPA's constitutionality, a challenge on the validity of the
statute may be a waste of resources.7 1 Many state courts, having
little law on point, have addressed RLUIPA tangentially (as it
72
relates to zoning ordinances), but have yet to overturn it. Due to
Congress' preference for religious expression and the
overwhelming acceptance of the law, a city or county should look
above their head whenever a religious group applies for a zoning
variance.73

69
70
71

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2000).
Challenging the constitutionality of the law also risks intervention by the
Justice Department.

Freedom Baptist v. Middleton, 204 F. Supp 2d. 857

(E.D. Pa. 2002); Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, 148 F. SupE. 2d 173 (D. Conn.
2001); DiLaura v. Ann Arbor, 30 Fed.Appx. 501 (6 Cir. 2002); Fifth
Avenue Presbyterian Church v. New York, 293 F.3d 570, 575 (2d Cir.
2002); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment, 218 F. Supp.
2d 1203 (C.D.Cal.,2000).
72 See Tran v. Gwinn, 262 Va. 572 (2001); McElroy v. Stanley, 22. Fed.Appx.
299 (4th Cir. 2001) (assuming RLUIPA is constitutionally valid); See also
h
Goodall v. Stafford Co. School Bd., 60 F.3d 168 4 Cir. 1995) (upholding
the previous incarnation of RLUIPA, the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act); State ex rel. Scadden v. Willhite, 2002 Ohio 1352, 19 (Ohio App. 10
Dist. 2002) ("Thus, given there has been no determination by any agency or
tribunal that the zoning resolution prohibits the particular use in question, we
cannot say whether any hypothetical prohibition would infringe on
appellants' religious practices in violation of RLUIPA or any constitutional
provisions.").
7 This does not mean that the only solution to a zoning problem is an RLUIPA
claim. Municipalities must be proactive. See John Throop, Church v. State,
AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, April 2003, at 16. The author states that
city planners should: 1. Recognize the economic worth of a religious
institution; 2. Look at religious facilities as part of the community; and 3.
Educate faith groups about land-use and zoning requirements. Id..
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III. THE CONTENT OF THE STATUTE

RLUIPA was designed to do two things. First, it protects
churches and religious groups. The government is not allowed to
impose a substantial burden on a person's free exercise of religion
through the use of an individualized land-use assessment, without
showing that the burden imposed is the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest in imposing that
burden. 74 Second, the law protects institutionalized persons
because a government is not allowed to impose a substantial
burden on a prisoner's free exercise of religion without showing
that the burden imposed is the least restrictive means of furthering
a compelling government interest. 75 But how does RLUIPA
accomplish this level of protection and retain its constitutional
fecundity? I will explain RLUIPA's robustness by examining its
requirements and illuminating much of the pertinent case law.
The basic premise of RLUIPA's zoning protections is
simple:
[N]o government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person,
including a religious assembly or institution, unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person, assembly or institution is in
furtherance of a compelling state interest; and, is the
least restrictive means76of furthering the compelling
governmental interest.
Congress has backed up the restriction even further by
stating: "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution
on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
institution." 77 To put it simply, "If a zoning regulation doesn't

74 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
7' 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
76

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).

7' 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000).
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permit churches in any area, then you lose." 78 The goal was to
place religion on equal footing with other groups, and, in that
respect, the Act has exceeded expectations.
A. RLUIPA's Definition of Religious
Exercise is Purposely All-Inclusive
In order to invoke RLUIPA, a showing of religious faith
must be provided. Nevertheless this bar is low and largely
restricted in its scope of investigation. The requirements of
religious exercise and the use of property for religious use are de
minimus and are designed to allow for as many people as possible.
RLUIPA defines religion broadly so that almost any spiritual act
can fall within its purview. 79 Religious exercise is defined as "any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief., 80 The Act goes on to say that the "use,
building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person81
for that purpose."
or entity that uses or intends to use the property
The requirements for religion fall in line with Supreme Court
jurisprudence as well. "The showing necessary for a religious
belief to be considered genuine is a minimal one...'It is not within
the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith, or the 82 validity of particular litigants'
interpretation of those creeds."'
In Joseph Heller's classic, CATCH-22, WWII pilots were
as insane. 83
ineligible for flight status unless they were certified
However, the only way to be adjudged insane was to ask the doctor
to certify you. Following this reasoning, if you could ask the
doctor to rule you insane then you were not insane, hence, the
78

Dam Report, supra note 1 (quoting William Kearns, past president of the

International Municipal Lawyers Association (IMLA)).
RLUIPA claims and defenses have been asserted successfully by individuals,
churches, couples, and institutions. See supra notes 14, 15; infra, note 116.
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B) (2000).

79

82

Horen v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 479 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. Ct. App.
1997) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div,
450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).

83

JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22

(Simon & Schuster 1964).
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Catch-22. Much the same situation arises in RLUIPA claims. A
religious institution can freely claim religious status, but the
municipality can do almost no probing of the religion in order to
determine if there is even a religious belief. Municipalities may
attempt to bring in witnesses to testify to the truth of the religion
asserted, but they are restricted by the following guidelines:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may
not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or
beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as
life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet
the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals
does not mean that they can be made suspect before
the law. Many take their gospel from the New
Testament. But it would hardly be supposed that
they could be tried before a jury charged with the
those teachings
duty of determining whether
84
representations.
false
contained
Beliefs need not be coherent or systemic in order to obtain
First Amendment protections. Courts should not undertake to
dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is
struggling with his position or because his beliefs are not
articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated
person might employ. 85 It is outside of a court's subject matter
jurisdiction to begin an inquiry into the veracity of religious
beliefs. "[I]t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious
practice or activity for one group is not religion under the
86 Further, "[i]t is fairly
protection of the First Amendment."
settled that there is no requirement that a religion meet any
organizational or doctrinal test in order to qualify for First
84

United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1944); see also Sherbert v.

85
86

Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). Here the Court stated that, "Even if
consideration of such evidence is not foreclosed by the prohibition against
judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs ... a question as to
which we intimate no view since it is not before us--it is highly doubtful
whether such evidence would be sufficient to warrant a substantial
infringement of religious liberties." Id.
Thomas, 450 U.S. 715.
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953).
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Amendment protection. ' ' 87 Similarly, the Supreme Court does not
allow a municipality's witness to attempt to testify as to the depth
of that belief.88
of belief of a religious group, nor to the value
Allowing them to testify would upset the Establishment Clause by
forcing the Court to choose between two subjective views
belief.89
attempting to define the sincerity of a religious
An inquiry into the religious nature of other members of the
religious institution is also precluded. In Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the Boy Scouts'
beliefs and found that the "exclusion of members solely on the
basis of their sexual orientation is inconsistent with Boy Scouts'
commitment to a diverse and 'representative' membership ... [and]
contradicts Boy Scouts' overarching objective to reach 'all eligible
youth."' 90 The appeals court came to the conclusion that "the
exclusion of members like Dale aVPears antithetical to the
However, the Supreme
organization's goals and philosophy."
this sort of inquiry; it
rejects
cases
of
history
Court held that their
is not the role of the courts to reject a group's expressed values
because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent. "[A]s is true of all expressions of First Amendment
freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the ground that they view
92 This idea was
a particular expression as unwise or irrational.
furthered in other Supreme Court jurisprudence which stated that
"[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or

87
88

Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 516 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Va. 1981).
"[T]he showing necessary for a religious belief to be considered genuine is a

minimal one... 'It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of

particular beliefs or practices to a faith or the validity of particular litigants'
interpretations of those creeds."' Horen, 479 S.E.2d at 558.
89 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); see also Ballard, 322
U.S. 78; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. 679 (1872); Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian, 262 Va. 604 (2001)
(stating that the Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom prohibit civil
courts from resolving ecclesiastical disputes which depend upon inquiry into
questions of faith or doctrine).
90 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2002).
92 Id. at 65 1.
9' Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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to others in order to merit First Amendment
comprehensible
93
protection."
RLUIPA does not give a religious group carte blanche to
do whatever they what, whereever they want. The interest that is
being protected must simply be a part of a system of beliefs,
94
whether or not it is central to the religion. While the examination
into the sincerity of beliefs is limited, the examination of whether
the act in question is religious is fairly sweeping. The practice that
impinges on zoning regulations must be religious. In Omnipoint
Communications v. White Plains, the court held as baseless a
Church's attempt to block the nearby building of a cellular
antenna. The church claimed the antennae would disrupt their
views from their sanctuary.95 In Grace United Methodist Church
v. Cheyenne, the court refused to grant summary judgment for a
church who claimed that their day-care facility was an exercise of
religion. The court stated that whether the day-care facility was
96
religious was a question of fact yet to be determined. Finally, in
Henderson v. Kennedy, the appeals court held that a regulation that
prohibits the selling of T-shirts on the "National Mall" was not a
substantial burden because the T-shirts were not part of the
religion, and this only curtailed one of the myriad of ways in which
97
the "National Mall.,
the plaintiffs could practice their religion on
B. Must a Group Notify a City of the Group's Religious
Nature?
A requirement that anyone who wants to exercise his or her
religion freely must first notify the city harkens back to WWII
Germany, where only state sponsored/approved religious speech
was acceptable. A party is guaranteed the right to freedom of
religion under the First Amendment, not the right to freedom of
religion as long as the government is satisfied. These requests are
beyond the scope of a government interest and would likely
9' Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707

(1981).

94 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc5(7)(A, B) (2000).

9' 202 F.R.D. 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
96 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1197 (Wyo. 2002).
97

347 U.S. App. D.C. 340, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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constitute an unconstitutional burden upon the religious groups of
any kind. The Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue and
struck down laws that required religious groups to notify the local
authorities of their presence.
As a matter of principle a requirement of
registration in order to make a public speech would
seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the
rights of free speech and free assembly. ... If the

exercise of the rights of free speech and free
assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think
this can be accomplished by the device of requiring
previous registration as a condition for exercising
them and making such a condition the foundation
for restraining in advance their exercise and for
imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining
order. So long as no more is involved than exercise
of the rights of free speech and free assembly, it is
immune to such a restriction ... We think a

requirement that one must register before he
undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support
with
for a lawful movement is quite incompatible
98
Amendment.
First
the requirements of the
Additionally, religious beliefs do not have to be codified in
a writing in order to qualify for protection. "A particular religious
belief that has no written creeds or houses of worship is of little
import when construing the individual beliefs of the plaintiffs
religion." 99 This view reflects nationwide case law. "It is fairly
settled that there is no requirement that a religion meet any
organizational or doctrinal test in order to qualify for First
Amendment protection."' l00 Therefore, religious beliefs, just need
to be what they say ... beliefs.

98 Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 218 (2002)
(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)).
F.2d 1159 (6" Cir. 1980).
99 Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620
100 Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 516 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D.Va. 1981).
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C. Who is the Government Anyway?
42 USC § 2000cc et seq was enacted to apply to federal,
state, city, and county governments, or any government operating
with the color of law. "The term government means a state,
county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under
the Authority of a State; any branch, department, agency,
instrumentality, or official of an entity listed previously; and any
'
other person acting under the color of State law." ' RLUIPA also
includes the United States, a branch, department, agency,
instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any other
person acting under the color of federal law as an organization
prohibited from inhibiting religious exercise. 102 As is seen, the
applicability is quite broad and includes agencies as well as their
officers.
The broad scope of possible defendants initially raised
questions about RLUIPA's stepping on the Eleventh Amendment.
Interestingly, once it arrived in the courts this question was largely
In Congressional hearings, Professor Laycock
overlooked.
dismissed the idea that RLUIPA would impinge upon federalist
principles for several reasons. First, while states possess immunity
from suit unless specifically denied it by Congress, local
10 3 The states proper
governments and officials are still vulnerable.
were not the parties committing the acts of discrimination; local
governments and their agents were the responsible persons. A
04
This is in
local official can be a subject of an RLUIPA claim.'
keeping with the Supreme Court's holdings that local officials only
have qualified immunity. 10 5 Furthermore, even state governments
are not immune to injunctive relief, which is often the crux of
RLUIPA legislation. 10 6 Finally, there is no Eleventh Amendment
question regardless of immunity, because RLUIPA is not specific
enough, nor does it ever purport to authorize any suit against the
'0'42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4) (2000).
102 Id.
103

104

105
106

Laycock Testimony, supra note 29; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
42 U.S.C. §2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii) (2000) (defining "government" as "any ...
person acting under color of State law.").
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 615 (1974); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 123.
DOUGLAS

MATERIALS

LAYCOCK,

MODERN

AMERICAN

REMEDIES:

493 (3rd ed., Aspen Law & Business 2002).

CASES

AND
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states themselves. 10 7 Since there is no specific grant of authority to
sue the states, there is not a problem.
Often a municipality will assert that RLUIPA contains only
a private cause of action against the government, not against the
people enforcing the law. This is not the case. Although the
statute says "[a] person may assert a violation of this Act as a
claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate
relief against a government", you must look at the definition of
1°
what a government is in order to understand the law. ' 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(4) defines government broadly. Even were this unclear
the legislative history shows that individuals fall within the law:
This section provides remedies for violations.
Sections 4(a) and (b) track RFRA, creating a private
cause of action for damages, injunction, and
declaratory judgment, and creating a defense to
liability, and providing for attorneys' fees. These
claims and defenses lie against a government, but
the Act does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of states. In the case of violation by a
by suits against state
state, the Act must be enforced
09
employees.
and
officials
As the legislative intent and the statute show the government
includes individuals in their official capacity as well as the
government itself.
D. When is an RLUIPA Claim Ripe for Adjudication?
The ability to bring a claim is a two-part process. First, the
party must have Art. III standing. The authority to bring a claim or
defense under RLUIPA is derived from the statute itself. "A
person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this
section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under
Laycock Testimony, supra note 26; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2003).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2003).
'o'
107

109

Canady Statement, supra note 17.
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Article III of the Constitution."' 10 A person has Art. III standing if
(1) "he has suffered injury in fact," (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and (3) the injury likely will be
redressed by a favorable decision of the court."' The injury must
affect the party claiming relief in a personal and individual way
that is legally cognizable.' 1 2 These typical standing requirements
are relaxed when the allegedly unconstitutional statute casts a
chilling effect upon a protected activity." 3 Simply put, the cause
of action arises at the point the burden is imposed.
Second, the injured party must fall within a protected class
of RLUIPA. Just because there is an injury does not mean that the
RLUIPA claim can be brought. The injury must occur pursuant to
the Congressional mandate. Section (a)(2) describes when the
injury is actionable. The RLUIPA claim is valid if there is a harm
and one of three situations exists. First, "the substantial burden is
imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial
assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability;" 4 or, second, "the substantial burden affects, or
removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with
foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes,
applicability;"' 15
even if the burden results from a rule of general
or, third, "the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation
that permit the government to
of a land use regulation or system ...
make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the
property involved." ' 1 6 If the harm occurs along with any or all of
these federally prescribed situations then the claim is actionable.

"042 USC § 2000cc-2(a) (2003).
'l'

Falwell v. Lynchburg, 198 F.Supp.2d 765, 772 (W.D. Va. 2002) (holding that
much of the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim was invalid because there was no
injury in fact).

112 Id

at 772.

113Laird
11442

v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).

USC § 2000cc(a)(2)(A) (2003).
115 42 USC § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2003).
116

42 USC § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2003).
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E. Is an Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Required Under RLUIPA?
While not specifically addressed in the law itself, numerous
cases have substantively dealt with whether an exhaustion of local
remedies is required before an RLUIPA claim may be brought. In
the zoning context, "exhausting local remedies" would mean
applying for a conditional use permit, a special use permit, or a
zoning variance before an RLUIPA claim could arise. If these
applications were denied, the religious institution would then also
have to appeal the ruling, typically to a Zoning Board of Appeals
(ZBA), before an RLUIPA claim would become actionable.
Exhaustion of local remedies has been specifically
addressed in RLUIPA and has not generally been found to be a
requirement. This ties in to the individualized assessment intent of
Because Congress intended for RLUIPA to be
Congress.
applicable in situations where the local authority has in place a
mechanism for making individualized assessments, there is no
need for exhaustion of local remedies. The intent was to allow suit
at the point of the burden, not after zoning application denial. In
Stuart Circle v. Bd. of Zoning App l,117 a church wanted to
continue its ministry of feeding the homeless. The 4 th Circuit
stated that RLUIPA's predecessor, RFRA, contained no
requirement that a burdened party pursue a conditional use permit.
Likewise, in Murphy v. Zoning Comm n, a case in which a couple
wanted to use their home for prayer meetings, the court found
"unpersuasive defendants' arguments that plaintiffs are required to
appeal the cease and desist orders to the ZBA before the decision is
final. RLUIPA contains no requirement that the town be given an
additional opportunity to comply with the act..."18 This holding
was affirmed in a second Murphy v. Zoning Comm 'n, stating that
the "exhaustion of local remedies is not required for claims under
... (RLUIPA).",19
The Sixth Circuit has been antipodal in regards to
exhaustion, and has made the only significant ruling that
exhaustion of remedies may be required. In DiLaura v. Ann Arbor,
"'

946 F.Supp. 1225 (E.D.Va. 1996).

148 F.Supp.2d 173, 183 (D.Conn. 2001).
...
"9 223 F.Supp.2d 377 (D.Conn. 2002).
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a couple wanted to use their home as a religious retreat on
weekends. When the City challenged the use and claimed that the
Dilauras must apply for a variance, the Court noted that "a
'conditional use' permit ...
is not a requirement in § 1983 actions,
claims. ' ' 20
whether alleging constitutional violations or statutory
However, in State ex rel. Scadden v. Willhite, the court stated that
"[o]ur determination of such would be premature, given that
appellants may file for a certificate of zoning compliance, which
could still hypothetically be granted. If such application is denied
and appellants continue the review and appellate process, such
application would be appropriate for review at that time.,' 121 In
Willhite, a local minister who provides food for the homeless was
told to shut down the ministry he runs on his own land. While the
court did not specifically state that an exhaustion of local remedies
must be done, they stated that they could not make a determination
on the RLUIPA claim absent a regulatory body ruling. This view,
however, is the minority; most courts hold that RLUIPA does not
of local remedies. This has been reinforced
require an exhaustion
22
law.'
by case
In order to provide plaintiffs with a more robust claim,
RLUIPA claims are often paired with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as
well. But even under § 1983, an exhaustion is not required before
proceeding with a suit. The Supreme Court stated in Patsy v.
Florida,that exhaustion of local remedies is not required in § 1983
claims. 123 In Patsy a state employee brought an action against her
employer university under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that she had
been denied employment opportunities based on her race and sex.
The Court held that "[b]ased on the legislative histories of both §
1983 and § 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state
administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to
bringing an action pursuant to a § 1983."' 24

120

121
122

30 Fed.Appx. 501, 505 (6th Cir. 2002).
2002 Ohio 1352 ( 1 0 th App.Dist. 2002).
See also John J. Dvorske, Validity, Construction, and Operationof Religious
Land Use And Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 181 A.L.R. FED 247

(2002).

123457 U.S. 496
124Id.at 516.

(1982).
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This idea has been addressed in RLUIPA claims before and
the Courts dismissed the idea that exhaustion was required. In
Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, the City attempted to enjoin the
plaintiffs from having prayer meetings in their home. Contrary to
the assertions of the town the court agreed "with plaintiffs that they
are not required to exhaust the state administrative remedies before
'
The Court in DiLaura also noted
pursuing their § 1983 claim."125
that RLUIPA claims brought via 42 U.S.C. § 1983-as the
DiLaura case was--do not require application for a variance or
even a first appeal to the zoning board. 26 Exhaustion and
assessments go hand in hand with the intent of Congress. Because
exhaustion was never intended, all Congress needed to put in
RLUIPA was that there be a mechanism for individualized
assessments in place.
F. What is an Individualized Assessment
Requirement?
RLUIPA does not require the physical act of an
individualized assessment. All that is needed is for a mechanism
of individualized assessments to be in place under local zoning
laws. "The substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of
a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under
which the government makes, or has in place formal or informal
procedures or practices that permit the government to make,
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property
involved."' 127 This idea has been upheld in the numerous cases that
stated no zoning application was needed when filling an RLUIPA

148 F.Supp.2d 173, 181 (D.Conn. 2001).
t
DiLaura v. Ann Arbor, 30 Fed.Appx. 501, 504 (6' Cir. 2002). "[A]
conditional use permit ... is not a requirement for § 1983 actions, whether
alleging constitutional violations or statutory claims." Id.
127 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(c) (2003).
125

126
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claim.128 This ties into the unique status that land and property has
always occupied in the American and English common law
systems. As any first year law student can attest, the system 1of
29
property law is based largely on the fact that all land is unique.
An individual assessment can be a zoning review, a survey, a
zoning enforcement officer ticketing the homeowners, etc. It is
fairly wide open to interpretation.
Even if a Defendant to an RLUIPA claim asserts that an
RLUIPA claim cannot be brought because there was no
individualized assessment, this is not fatal. The requirement is
easily overcome by also asserting the claim under the Commerce
Clause requirement. The Supreme Court has long held that
religious groups can affect interstate commerce. 30 Therefore, if
the religious group can not apply for a variance, then the RLUIPA
claim must simply be amended to fit the burdened party
underneath the section of RLUIPA which holds, "the substantial
burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with
Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability.,, 131 Often this problem is avoided by utilizing both
A look at the legislative history of RLUIPA illustrates that it was intended to
target zoning ordinances in which there is a simple mechanism in place for
individualized assessments: Section 3(b)(1)(A) specifically targets the
established evidence of discriminatory land use regulations based on
Congress' remedial power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, pursuant
to the Court's directive in Boerne, and tracks the Smith opinion's explanation
that, where governmental bodies possess authority to make "individualized
assessments" of the reasons for certain conduct, those bodies may not
substantially burden a person's free exercise activities without a compelling
interest. Section 3(b)(1)(A) advances this very proposition, requiring a
compelling state interest "in any system of land use regulation or
exemption" in which "a government has the authority to make
individualized assessments of the proposed uses to which real property
would be put," and thus protects free exercise as interpreted by the Smith
available at
17,
supra note
Statement,
Canady
Court.
http://www.rluipa.com/generaldocs/HouseRept 06-219.pdf
129 "The law of property is bottomed, in part, on the proposition that all land is
unique." Kimberling North, Inc. v. Pope, 100 S.W.3d 863, 872 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2003).
130 Camps Newfound v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
13142 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A) (2003).

128
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and the individualized assessment prongs at
interstate commerce
32
the outset.1

G. Can an Institution Bring Suit or is RLUIPA Only for
Individuals?
The Supreme Court has held that ministries, prayer
meetings, and esp'ecially churches all satisfy the threshold of
interstate commerce. The Supreme Court made clear in Camps
Newfound. v. Harrison that the Commerce Clause applies to
charitable and non-profit entities.' 33 These entities count as major
participants in interstate markets for goods and services, use of
interstate communications and transportation, as well as raising
and distributing revenues interstate (including voluntary
revenues). 134 "We see no reason why the nonprofit character of an
the
enterprise should exclude it from the coverage of either
' 35
Clause."'
Commerce
the
of
aspect
affirmative or the negative
Any question as to whether a burden can be imposed on a
non-person has been long resolved. Under both case law and
RLUIPA, substantial burdens on religious exercise apply to both
persons and institutions. RLUIPA covers any religious assembly or
institution whose religious exercise suffers a substantial burden
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp.
2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (brief of the complainant), available at
(last
http://www.rluipa.com/cases/CottonwoodAmendedComplaint.pdf
accessed July 1, 2003).
113 Harrison,520 U.S.
at 584.
114 Id. at 583-86.
135 There are a number of lines of commerce in which both for-profit and
nonprofit entities participate. Some educational institutions, some hospitals,
some child-care facilities, some research organizations, and some museums
generate significant earnings; and some are operated by not-for-profit
corporations. A nonprofit entity is ordinarily understood to differ from a forprofit corporation principally because it "is barred from distributing its net
earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as
members, officers, directors, or trustees. Summer camps may be operated as
for-profit or nonprofit entities; nonprofits may depend -- as here -- in
substantial part on fees charged for their services. Whether operated on a forprofit or nonprofit basis, they purchase goods and services in competitive
markets, offer their facilities to a variety of patrons, and derive revenues
from a variety of sources, some of which are local and some out of State. Id.
at 584-85.
132
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imposed by the government. "No government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including
a religiousassembly or institution ...,,136
Federal case law supports this proposition as well. "It is
Clause protects 'religious
clear, of course, that the Free Exercise
' 37
individuals."'
as
well
organizations' as
The opinion radiates, however, a spirit of freedom
for religious organizations, an independence from
secular control or manipulation, in short, power to
decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine. Freedom ... where no improper
methods of choice are proven, we think, must now
be said to have federal constitutional protection as a
part of the free exercise of religion against state
interference. 138
By inhibiting a ministry, or forcing an institution to forgo
its desired religious activity, a municipality will likely create a
substantial burden upon an institution's free exercise of religion.
The loss of the ability to minister to even one person is a
substantial burden on religious exercise. "Violations of First
Amendment rights constitute per se irreparable injury."'' 39 As
previously noted a burden is imposed even where the impairment
exists for only a minimal period of time. 140 "The loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.""14 If the injury is
13642

U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2003) (emphasis added).

13'E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng'g, 859 F.2d 610, 620 (9 t" Cir. 1988) (citing Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).

Kedroff 344 U.S. at 116; see also Presbyterian Church of the United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-49
(1969).
139Doe v. Shenandoah Co. Sch. Bd., 737 F. Supp. 913, 916 (W.D. Va. 1990)
(citing Johnson v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1978)).
140Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
14' Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373-374; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
'3
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imminent, a burden is imposed. As the Court held in Elrod, "First
Amendment interests were either threatened or in fact being
impaired at the time relief was sought. ' ' 4 2 Therefore, when an
at the time of respondents'
injury is both threatened and 1occurring
43
imposed."'
is
burden
motion a
There are numerous examples of religious exercise claims
that involve institutions. In Western PresbyterianChurch v. Bd. of
Zoning Adjustment, the court held that the city's use of its zoning
powers to block a church's ten-year old ministry to feed the poor
and homeless constituted a substantial burden. 144 Fifth Avenue
PresbyterianChurch v. New York is an RLUIPA case that did not
question that a substantial burden should be imposed on a church if
the city of New York attempted to shut down its established
ministry of allowing the homeless to sleep on its property.145 The
court rejected the argument that homeless should be required to
sleep only in alternative licensed locations determined by the
City. 146 When the government denies a religious institution the
ability to minister to even one of the individuals it has been
serving, the government 147fundamentally inhibits the institution
ability to practice its faith.
H. What Constitutes a Substantial Burden?
[P]laintiffs must show that defendants imposed or
implemented a land use regulation that placed a
substantial burden on their religious practices. In
making this showing for ripeness purposes,
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the governmental
decision that allegedly violates RLUIPA is a
decision that burdens their religious beliefs or
142

Elrod, 427 U.S. at 374.

143 Id.

144862
145293

F. Supp. 538, 545-47 (D.D.C. 1994).
F.3d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 2002).

Id.; see also State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 39 N.E. 2d 515, 525 (Oh.
1942) (rejecting argument that because sites in the business district were still
available it was permissible to deny churches from locating in residential
districts).
141Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp.
2d 1203, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
146
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practices. On its face, RLUIPA requires only that
the "final decision" made by the governmental
agency be to implement or impose a14 8land use
regulation against an individual or entity.
By seeking to obtain injunctive relief, by ticketing religious
institutions, or by denying a zoning permit a municipality can
create a substantial burden on religious exercise. It does not take
much for a burden to be substantial when it involves First
Amendment rights. Again, "[t]he loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal14 periods of time, unquestioningly
constitutes irreparable injury."
What constitutes a substantial burden has also addressed by
the Supreme Court. A substantial burden occurs when a person is
forced "to choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning the
precepts of her religion on the other."' 150 This idea has been used
repeatedly in employment cases holding that a law that forces a
religious adherent to forgo their religion in lieu of benefits creates
a substantial burden upon religion. This idea is furthered in other
cases. A burden upon religion exists when "the state conditions
receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a
religious faith, or where it denied such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
pressure 15on
1
beliefs."
Federal statutory law lowers this threshold under RLUIPA,
where religious exercise is defined as "any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to a system of religious
belief."' 152 Therefore, it would seem that any actions taken by the
government that impinge upon religious exercise of any sort, could
conceivably constitute a substantial burden.
148 Murphy

v. Zoning Comm'n of The Town of New Milford, 148 F. Supp. 2d

173, 184 (D.Conn. 2001), aff'd, 223 F.Supp.2d 377 (D.Conn. 2002).
U.S. at 373.
150 Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
15' Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
717-18 (1981).
112 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2003).
149 Elrod, 427
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Under the federal framework, the level needed to achieve
protected exercise is very low. What is a substantial burden under
the federal case law is even lower under RLUIPA. As the court
found in Murphy, "because plaintiffs potentially face the choice
between complying with a cease and desist order that violates
federally protected rights and facing civil and criminal penalties
for violating the order, the hardship to which they are subject tips
the balance in favor of finding this matter ripe for review."153 Still,
federal courts are reticent to derive a substantial burden on religion
where a zoning regulation merely creates an inconvenience, such
as applying for a permit, or when a zoning ordinance results in a
religious group having to pay more money to build a church.1 54 It
is established that there is no substantial burden where a law or
policy merely makes the practice of the religious beliefs more
expensive. 155
Other states have lowered the threshold for substantial
burdens even further. Virginia has been more protective of
religious liberties and has provided a broader standard that than put
forth in Sherbert. "A substantial burden is imposed on the free
exercise of religion where governmental action compels a party to
affirm a belief they do not hold, discriminates on the basis or
religious beliefs, inhibits the dissemination of particular religious
beliefs, or compels a party to forgo their religious practices."' 56 In
Horen v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the appellants were convicted
of possession of owl feathers which were used in the appellants
Native American religious practices. The court found that the
statute prohibiting possession of owl feathers was not religiously
it substantially burdened the free exercise of
neutral, 1therefore
57
religion.
Other courts have ruled similarly. In Woods v. Evatt, the
court held that where a "practice places a substantial burden on the
Murphy, 148 F.Supp.2d at 186.
Grace United Methodist Church v. Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1197
(Wyo. 2002). (holding that the county's zoning regulations had the incidental
effect of making the practice of religion more expensive for the church
because it had to build elsewhere in the county was inconsequential) Id.
155 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
156 479 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
157 Id. Furthermore, the court held that Virginia had no compelling government
interest in advancing the statute.
153

154
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religious exercises ...if it coerces them into violating their
religious beliefs, or if it compels them to refrain, 'by threat 15of8
sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct."'
Other courts have held that a number factors must be looked at to
determine the substantiality of the burden, including:
1. whether a particular practice is mandated by a religion
or simply encouraged by it, and/or
159
2. the extent of the governmental interference involved.
In Turner-Bey v. Lee, the court was faced with whether a
state correctional officer violated an inmate's free exercise of
religion when they deprived the appellant of wearing a crown for
45 minutes. 160 The wearing of the crown was part of the teaching
of the Moorish Science faith. However, because the appellant
presented no evidence of the belief, and the state only deprived the
appellant prisoner for 45 minutes the court held that there was no
substantial burden.
The factors-based approach is reflected in other cases as
well:
In determining the substantiality of the burden it is
certainly appropriate to take into account as one of
the factors to be determined whether a particular
practice is mandated by a religion or simply
Another factor that obviously must
encouraged ...
be taken into account ...is the extent of the
interference.... 161
In this framework a substantial burden is one "that forces adherents
of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct or
expression that manifests a central tenet of a person's religious

158Woods

v. Evatt, 876 F. Supp. 756, 762 (D.S.C. 1995), affd, No. 95-6750,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 33887, at *1 (4 th Cir. 1995).
Turner-Bey v. Lee, 935 F.Supp. 702, 703 (D. Md. 1996).
159
160 Id.
161 Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning App'l, 946 F. Supp. 1225 (1996)
(quoting Turner-Bey, 935 F.Supp. at 703)
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compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those
beliefs, or
1

beliefs."' 62

I. Can the Burden be Overcome by Moving the Group?
Because the location of the property is the major issue in
RLUIPA litigation, it is not uncommon for a municipality to offer
the option to move. The mere fact that a government asserts that it
would help in finding lawful and permitted alternative locations
does not mean that this is not a substantial burden. Courts have
held, that despite the existence of alternative locations to carry out
its ministry, requiring a religious institution to abandon an
established location for its ministry constitutes a substantial
burden. These ideas are reflected in Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of
Zoning App ':
Finally, it may be noted that having the Ministry
conducted at various locations would not cure the
prohibition on the serving of food during the
summer months. For these reasons, plaintiffs have
thus shown a substantial likelihood of proving that
the ordinance would force them to abstain from any
action which their religion mandates that they
take. "3
In Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, the court held that requiring
plaintiffs to abandon their established home prayer meeting
ministry was a substantial burden, even in the absence of any
finding that the home was the only place in the city where the
ministry could be conducted. 164 In Murphy the burden arose
because people stopped attending the prayer meetings out of fear
of criminal prosecution by the City. The burden was not alleviated
65
In another case,
by the City's attempts to shift the meetings.
Jesus Center v. FarmingtonHills Zoning Bd., the court ruled that
Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning App'l, 946 F. Supp. 1225 (1996)
(quoting Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996)).
163 Stuart Circle Parish, 946 F. Supp. at 1239.
164 148 F.Supp. 2d 173, 188 (D. Conn. 2001).
165 Id. at 188.
162
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the city's denial of a zoning variance to allow an established
church-operated homeless shelter to continue at its current
the undisputed
location, constituted a substantial burden, despite
166
shelter.
a
for
locations
existence of alternative
J. What is the Compelling Governmental
Interest?
Local governments are subjected to a strict scrutiny level of
review. Even "[w]here a law that substantially burdens the free
exercise of religion is not 'neutral,' the government must prove
that the law is necessary to advance a compelling government
interest and does so in the least restrictive manner." 167 Compelling
state interests are those that prevent "'clear and present, grave and
immediate danger' to public health, peace and welfare." ' 68 This
creates an even higher barrier for a municipality to overcome. "If
you have a religious exercise being substantially burdened by a
land use regulation, then the government can pretty much in my
view forget about justifying it with a compelling interest. 16That's
9
very, very, very difficult for the government to ever prove."
Section 4(b) of RLUIPA shifts the burden of proof to the
state when the party seeking RLUIPA relief establishes that they
are suffering a substantial burden upon their free exercise of
religion. A government's substantial interest is not the same as a
compelling one. A compelling state interest is not the presence of
increased traffic, nor is it the complaints of neighbors. Burdens
upon religious exercise are only justified in "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests." 170 Furthermore, compelling
state interests are those that prevent "clear and present,7 1grave and
immediate danger to public health, peace and welfare."'
544 N.W.2d 698, 704 (Mich. App. 1996).
167Horen v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 479 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. Ct. App.
166

1997) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).

168

First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash. 1992) (citing
Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wn.2d 1, 9 (Wash. 1992).

169Dam Report, supra note 1 (quoting Prof. Jerold Kayden, Associate Professor

of Urban Planning, Harvard University Graduate School of Design).
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
17'First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 187.
170 Sherbert
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Religious exercise is also free speech. This concept should
only buttress RLUIPA claims. "[S]peech on public issues occupies
the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values', and
is entitled to special protection," i.e. a compelling government
interest is needed. 172 "It is basic that no showing merely of a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest [will] suffice;
in this highly sensitive constitutional area, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation."'' 73 A restriction on free speech must be accompanied
by a compelling government interest, otherwise the restriction is
facially invalid.
A city's substantial interest, while valid, does not amount
to a compelling interest sufficient to justify burdening the free
exercise of religion:
It is certainly the case that zoning constitutes one of
the most important functions of local government ...
Compatibility of land uses falls within this category
as does the need to protect the public safety and
general welfare of the people. Yet, such assertions
would not constitute compelling state interests to
overcome proof of intentional discrimination of a
suspect category, such as race. Nor does such
conclusory assertions constitute a compelling state
interest, here, where there has been a showing of a
burden on the free exercise of
substantial
174
religion.
The reasons given most often by municipalities for the
imposition of their burdens include: traffic, 175 parking, noise
172

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983).
v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 479 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. Ct. App.

173Horen

1997); see also American Legion v. Durham, 239 F.3d 601, 610 (4th Cir.

2001) (Clarifying the point that a City's concern over traffic safety may
amount to a substantial interest, but that their concerns did not equate to a
compelling government interest).

174Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning App'l, Va., 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1239

(E.D. Va. 1996).

175 Cornerstone

Bible Church v. Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991);

Jehovah's Witnesses v. Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
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levels, effect on property values and aesthetics. While these are all
176
real interests, they usually do not qualify as compelling interests:
A law burdening religious practice that is not
neutral or not of general application must undergo
the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the
commands of the First Amendment, a law
restrictive of religious practice must advance
'interests of the highest order' and must be
narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.... The
compelling interest standard that we apply once a
law fails to meet the Smith requirements is not
'watered ...
down, but really means what it says.' ...
Where government restricts only conduct protected
by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible
measures to restrict other conduct producing
substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort,
the interest given77in justification of the restriction is
not compelling. 1
Often a city asserts that they have a compelling
governmental interest in the health, safety, and welfare of local
residents by promoting acceptable traffic levels. While these
interests are legitimate they do not arise to the level of a
compelling government interest.' 78 "The interest advanced must
be paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the
government to show it." 179 If it is a city imposing a substantial
burden upon the religious believers the city must present evidence
that they are protecting the health and safety of local residents.
Both at common law and under RLUIPA, the burden of proof lies
The bare assertions by a government
with the municipalities.'
that they have an interest must be proven by more than the
176 Roman

P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. A Constitutional Response to
UnconstitutionalZoning Practices,9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 965 (2001).
177Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993).
178 id.

179Elrod

v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
"80 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2003).
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government's own allegations. They must definitively prove a
compelling governmental interest in shutting down a religious
181
institution, or attempting to move an institution elsewhere.
Furthermore, a compelling state interest does not arise from
the complaints of neighbors against an unpopular person. 182 As a
general matter, therefore, the public's "negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a
zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for..." local officials
zoning land use decisions. 183 "Irrational, arbitrary governmental
measures taken against a politically unpopular target on the basis
of complaining neighbors' fears or negative attitudes are repugnant
Only when a municipal
to constitutional guarantees."' 84
government can show an actual harm, in conjunction with the
complaints, can the complaints of neighbors be a compelling
government interest.
K. Why Use A Sledgehammer to Kill a Gnat?
Even if a municipality can show that they have a
compelling interest that is harmed by a religious institution, the
city will still have a difficult time of showing that its actions are
the least restrictive means of protecting that interest. Even a
municipality's seeking of a cease-and-desist order against a home
prayer group was not the least restrictive means:
The Court finds no evidence on the record that the
issuance of a cease and desist order based on the
181
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). The Supreme
Court required the City to produce evidence relevant to the problem the City
addresses through its zoning ordinance, rather than rely on the City's bare
assertions.
182 See also Pathways Psychosocial v. Leonardtown, 223 F. Supp. 2d 699 (D.
Md. 2002); Sullivan v. Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171 (3 d Cir. 1987); Horizon

House Dev. Serv. Inc. v. Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.Pa.
1992), affd mem., 995 F.2d 217 (3rd Cir. 1993); Oxford House-Evergreen v.
Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991). Each of these cases note the
government's unjustifiable, illegal, and often unconstitutional yielding to

community fears.

183 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
184 Marks v. Chesapeake, 723 F. Supp. 1155, 1163 (E.D.Va. 1988), affd 883

F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989).
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Commission's opinion was the "least restrictive
means" of protecting the health and safety of their
community. Defendant's primary concern with the
plaintiffs activities was the increased level of
traffic on the street, and the safety issues inherent in
an increased volume of traffic....To the extent culde-sac parking was deemed a problem,
the... decision to bar off-street parking in the
Murphy's driveway and rear yard seems
inconsistent185 with the expressed concerns of the
neighbors.
Even were there a cognizable interest, the interest asserted
by the municipalities usually does not rise to the level that the
Supreme Court has generally found to justify burdens on religious
exercise - child exploitation and maintenance of social security
programs. 186 "If a State has open to it a less drastic way of
satisfying its legitimate interest, it may not choose a legislative
broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal
scheme that
1 87
liberties."
Burdens become substantial once a case is properly made
by a burdened religious group. RLUIPA was enacted to protect
religious institutions from discrimination through zoning laws.
The law was designed to make things more difficult for cities and
it has done just that, often hurtling past a generation of Supreme
Court zoning jurisprudence. RLUIPA is a powerful tool and one
that can be wielded with a heavy hand.
IV.

Is THERE A TYPICAL CLAIM?

Given the above factors how an RLUIPA claim arises
factually is often very intriguing. While recognizing that no two
v. Zoning Comm'n., 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 190 (D. Conn. 2001).
See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321

185Murphy

186

U.S. 158 (1944); Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A
Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REv 929 (2001).

187Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 59 (1973)).
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sets of circumstances are alike there are numerous threads that
pervade RLUIPA claims. For public policy scholars the themes
should be
familiar. They are the NIMBY, the BANANA, and the
88
1
LULU.
First, is the NIMBY or "Not In My Back Yard" effect. A
NIMBY is a development that people recognize needs to be made,
but just do not want it done near them. 189 In RLUIPA cases this is
evidenced where a church wants to build in an area that the
neighbors do not want. The neighbors will then petition the zoning
boards to deny the application. In Life Teen v. Yavapai, a Catholic
Youth Ministry wanted to build a youth camp. Local residents
protested the camp, consequently the local zoning board put up
bureaucratic roadblocks, such as requests for aquifer, bond
requests, and water studies. 190 The camp filed suit shortly
thereafter.
This behavior was also manifest in Fifth Ave.
Presbyterian Church v. New York, where, because of the
complaints of neighbors, the City sought to prevent a church from
allowing the homeless to sleep on their steps. 19' The Church
quickly filed suit as well.
Another variant is the BANANA, or the "Build Absolutely
Nothing Anywhere Near Anything." Frequently this is manifested
in a zoning board's refusing to grant permission for a already
existing church and/or ministry to expand on its own land. For
instance, in Alabama a Jewish congregation wanted to demolish
some of its property and expand thereon. The local preservation

188

Herbert Inhaber, NIMBY and LULU, REGULATION:

THE CATO REVIEW OF

AND
GOVERNMENT
(Fall
1991),
at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl4n4-inhaber.html
(last accessed
July 1, 2003).
189 Id. Such as prisons, half-way houses, and waste facilities. Id.
190Life Teen Inc. v. Yavapai, NO. CV 01-1490 (D.Az. Aug. 21, 2001); see also
BUSINESS

Dam Report, supra note 1; http://www.rluipa.com/cases/LifeTeenAZ.html;
Kelly Ettenborough, Mesa Group Names Yarnell in Suit, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Aug. 11, 2001, at lB.
19' 293 F.3d 570, 572 (2 nd Cir. 2002).
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commission refused because of historic concerns.' 9 2 Here to the
synagogue filed suit to use their property as they saw fit.
The final situation, "Locally Unwanted Land Use"
(LULU), is perhaps the most acrid. In LULU's the situations can
become extremely acrimonious and outright fraudulent. The
greatest example of this - and perhaps the best example of the
need for RLUIPA - is Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress
Redevelopment. 19 3 Here the authorities actively pursued illicit
alternatives while denying the Church its ability to develop its own
property.
Cottonwood Christian Center is a large urban, multi-ethnic,
non-denominational church near Cypress, California. Because of
the Church's phenomenal growth, Cottonwood decided to
relocate. 194 The church raised money to purchase property to build
a much larger facility, eventually spending $13 million on 18 acres
Cottonwood then filed an
from multiple landowners. 195
application for a Conditional Use Permit (CUP) to build new
facilities in October of 2000. The city summarily rejected the
application, claiming that they needed a preliminary design
review. 196 This was despite the fact that there was no requirement
for a preliminary design review. The City then sent Cottonwood a
letter informing them that the City was adopting a moratorium on
any new permit applications in the area. 97
Amazingly, during this self-imposed moratorium the City
actively sought other parties to develop Cottonwood's property.
198
The City eventually found interest from the Costco Corporation.
In February 2002 the City Council stated that they had improperly

192

Temple B'Nai Sholom v. Huntsville, CV-01-S-1412-NE (N.D. Ala. Oct.

at
available
complainant),
of
the
2001)
(brief
see also
http://www.rluipa.com/cases/TempleBnaiSholomAmended.pdf;
http://www.eluls.org/reporter-jan2002/jan2002_smith.htrnl; see also Dam
Report, supra note 1.
193 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment, 218 F.Supp.2d 1203
(C.D.Cal. 2000).
194 Id. at 1212.
'9' Id. at 1213.
196 id.
'9

Id. at 1214.

198Id.
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rejected Cottonwood's application. 199 Nonetheless, the Council
then approved a redevelopment plan with Costco that included
Cottonwood's property. 200 In April of 2002, the Redevelopment
Agency selected a development proposal from Costco, who did not
own the land in question. The City then asked Cottonwood
whether they were interested in participating in the Town Center
plan. 201 When Cottonwood refused to sell their land the City
adopted a resolution of necessity, determining that it was necessary
for the Redevelopment Agency to acquire the land and directing
counsel to file an eminent domain action.20 2 The City filed an
action in California state court to condemn the land on May 29,
RLUIPA claim for
2002. Shortly thereafter Cottonwood filed20 its
3
damages and a temporary restraining order.
The City filed a motion to dismiss the federal claim but the
district court sided with Cottonwood calling "[a]ny claim by the
City that it will suffer hardship by the issuance of the injunction is
incredible on its face." 204 Further, the court noted that the tactics
of the city have "done the equivalent of using a sledgehammer to
kill an ant. ' "2 The Court also stated that "[p]reventing a church
from building a worship site fundamentally inhibits its ability to
practice its religion. Churches are central to the religious exercise
of most religions. If Cottonwood could not build a church, it could
not exist." 206 When the court turned down the City's motion to
dismiss, the City quickly settled.
Cases such as Cottonwood show the need for the
RLUIPA. Without RLUIPA, Cottonwood would
have been forced to have its rights vindicated in the
state court condemnation proceeding. In reference
to such a proceeding, the court stated: "Cottonwood
could not.. .assert its claims regarding the City's
refusal to grant its CUP application and the other
199Id.

Id.
id.
202 Id. at
203 Id.
204 Id.at
205 Id. at
206 Id. at
200

201

1215.
1231.
1229.
1226.
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zoning decisions affecting the Cottonwood
There would be no justice for
Property., 20 7
Cottonwood if the City had gotten its way. This
case ran the gamut of what RLUIPA can do. At a
minimum, RLUIPA acts as an important stop-gap to
prevent a municipality from acting in behavior that
is rash, if not deceitful. At its highest rung,
RLUIPA serves to protect the rights that were
208
granted to us in the First Amendment.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Although RLUIPA has seen success in the courts, the act is
not impregnable. Changes are occurring in the RLUIPA zoning
landscape. No longer is the veil of invincibility still present.
Consequently, decisions in the 3rd and 9 th Circuits have placed
much of RLUIPA's robustness in question.
In Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington, the 3 rd Circuit
reversed an earlier district court's ruling on RLUIPA.2 °9
Interestingly, the court did not annul RLUIPA or declare it
unconstitutional. The appeals court sent the case back to the trial
level for equal protection adjudication. 210 The Congregation Kol
Ami is a Jewish congregation that desired to use the land that they
However, when the
purchased for Sabbath service. 211
Congregation applied for a permit they were denied by the
municipality who cited traffic and safety concerns. The trial court
had held that the town of Abington was preventing Congregation
in violation of the
Kol Ami from using a former Catholic church,
212
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment:
207

208

Id. at 1230.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

"Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances."
209 Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington, 309 F.3d 120 ( rd Cir.
2002)
3
[Hereinafter CongregationKol Ami II].
210 Id. at 143-44.
211 Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington, 161 F.Supp.2d 432, 435 (E.D.Pa. 2001).
212 Id. at 436-37.
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Not only does a house of worship inherently further
the public welfare, but defendants' traffic, noise and
light concerns also exist for the uses currently
allowed to request a special exception. Indeed, there
can be no rational reason to allow a train station,
bus shelter, municipal administration building,
police barrack, library, snack bar, pro shop, club
house, county club or other similar use to request a
special exception under the 1996 Ordinance, but not
Kol Ami.213
But on appeal, the court instructed the district court to
rehear whether the church at issue was similarly situated to other
zoning applicants. While cognizant of the RLUIPA requirement of
strict scrutiny in zoning decisions, the court stated "local zoning
214
ordinances are subject to a very forgiving standard of review.
The 3 rd Circuit then stated that the decision of the lower court
should be passed through a two step analysis. First, the district
court must ask whether the Congregation is similarly situated as
other zoning applicants.2 15 Second the district court must find
whether there is a rational basis for distinguishing between the
Congregation and other applicants. 216 This was the pattern in
zoning disputes prior to RLUIPA. Unfortunately, the appeals court
failed to implement the strict scrutiny requirement of RLUIPA. 211
What other circuits-let alone the district court-will do with this
ruling remains an issue to be resolved.
Even more interesting is that for the first time a federal
district court found RLUIPA's zoning restrictions unconstitutional.
The offending case is Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake
Elsinore.21 In his opinion Judge Wilson mirrors much of the
Id. at 437.
214 CongregationKol Ami 11, 309 F.3d at 135.
213

217

Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2003) (requiring a compelling governmental

218

interest in the least restrictive means).
Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163

215
216

available
2003),
23,
June
(C.D.Ca.
http://www.rluipa.com/cases/Elsinore.html (last accesses July 1, 2003).

at,
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thinking from Madison. In short, the Elsinore Christian Center
was growing rapidly and needed more space. 219 They wanted to
renovate an abandoned school in Lake Elsinore, California. 220 The
City, however, denied the Center's application for a Conditional
221
In motions for summary judgment the court found
Use Permit.
that the City had violated RLUIPA but Judge Wilson then stated
that RLUIPA was unconstitutional because the act "establishes an
entirely new and different standard than that employed in prior
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. 2 2 2 Judge Wilson went on to
state "it is the Act's explicit redefinition of223'religious exercise' that
effects a manifest change in the analysis."
Mirroring the 9 th Circuit, the Elsinore court held that the
Supreme Court has never applied a compelling interest standard in
a land use challenge because zoning regulations do not generally
224
Thus, "Free Exercise precedent
infringe upon religious tenets.
does not require the compelling interest test be applied in this
context. 2 2 5 The "compelling interest standard has only been
rarely applied by the Supreme Court in other free exercise
contexts, never (to this Court's knowledge) in a land use
,,226
Judge Wilson went on to question the findings of
challenge.
7
held that "RFRA was so 'out of proportion
eventually
Congress2
to a supposed remedial or preventative object, that it [could not] be
understood as responsive to ... unconstitutional behavior.', 2 2 8 The
judge then decided that "RLUIPA suffers precisely the same
According to the court, RLUIPA exceeded
infirmity. '229
Brief of Complainant at 4-5, Elsinore (No. CV 01-04842 SVW (RCx)),
(last
available at http://www.rluipa.com/cases/ElsinoreComplaint.pdf
accesses July 1, 2003).
220 Id. at 6.
221 Elsinore 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
222/(/. at 1170.
223 id.
224 See generally Id. at 1176-77.
221Id. at 1177 n.5.
226 Id. at 1177.
227 Id. at 1180 (stating "In fact, the hearing record consists of a relatively small
2'9

number of anecdotal instances in which religious assemblies were
dissatisfied with zoning decisions or regulations, few of which constitute
state or municipal action of a clearly unconstitutional character.").
228 Id. at 1180 (quoting Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
229 Id. at 1180.
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Congress's Rower under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A few caveats must be noted. First, the ruling only took on
the issue of individualized assessments. 231 The court did not rule
on whether the Commerce Clause provisions of RLUIPA were
valid. 2332 Second, it appears that the district court did not fully
grasp the Supreme Court ruling in Employment Div. v. Smith
stating that where an individualized assessment is utilized by a
city, the courts are to utilize strict scrutiny as the standard of
review. 233 The court failed to realize that fundamental rights,
including religion, are supposed to be given a higher standard of
protection. Third, this ruling is new and the ramifications of the
decision are not yet known. It is fairly certain, however, that any
Circuit which was wavering on RLUIPA's zoning constitutionality
may now have something to latch onto. Interestingly, since Judge
Wilson's opinion in Elsinore, the RLUIPA zoning landscape has
shifted toward viewing RLUIPA as constitutional. In its final
adjudication the court in Murphy again held that "RLUIPA violates
neither the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment nor the
Enforcement Clause of section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment., 234 Additionally, in Westchester Day School v.
Village of Mamaronek the court held RLUIPA constitutional
stating:
In limiting its applicability outside of the Spending and
Commerce Clauses to those cases where governments
make "individual assessments," the statute draws the very
line Smith itself drew when it distinguished neutral laws of
general applicability from those "where the State has in
230

d. at 1182.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2003).
232 Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1182-83. The Commerce Clause provisions of
RLUIPA are contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2003), which applies
when "the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
231

233
234

would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or
with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability."
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17830, 102 (D.Conn.
Sept. 30, 2003).
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place a system of individual exemptions," but nevertheless
"refuses to extend that system to cases of 'religious
hardship.
VI. MADISON

235

V. RITER AND THE NEW RLUIPA BATTLEFIELD

While the impact of RLUIPA is more easily noticed in
zoning disputes, major legal battles are also taking place involving
RLUIPA prisoner litigation. 236 Lately, for every circuit that holds
that RLUIPA is valid for institutionalized persons, another circuit
rules RLUIPA is unconstitutional. The Western District of
Virginia, in a decision earlier this year, stated that RLUIPA was
unconstitutional.1 3' That ruling was appealed to the 4 th Circuit, 238
where arguments were held October 28, 2003.239 Upon appeal the
4th Circuit unanimously overturned the district court's ruling.
However, because of the uniqueness of district court's judgment
the case is well worth review. In fact, other circuits have utilized
the reasoning from the district court in holding RLUIPA
unconstitutional.240
In Madison v. Riter, the plaintiff, Ira Madison, is a Jewish
inmate in the Virginia prison system and a member of the Hebrew
Israelite faith. 241 As part of this belief, Madison requires a Kosher

Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15911, 14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003) (quoting Freedom Baptist Church v.
Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 873-74 (E.D.Pa. May 8, 2002)).
236 This is not a discussion of the content of RLUIPA's prison composition,
42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, because, for all practical purposes, the law is identical.
The only significant way the two sections differ is that the prisoner statute
says nothing about individualized assessments.
t
237 Madison v. Riter, 240 F.Supp.2d 566 (4 Cir. 2003).
238
Id. at 582.
239
4t'
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals,
Argument
Calendar, at
http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/calendar/intemetcaloct282003ric.pdf
240 See infra note 250.
241 Madison, 240 F.Supp.2d at 568.
235
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243

diet. 242 The Plaintiff requested the diet in July of 2000.. The
local officials approved the request, but the agency charged with
reviewing such requests reversed the decision stating that the
prisoner had no compelling religious reason to participate in the
diet. 244 The agency further stated that since there was no religious
belief the prisoner could satisfy his needs in the regular food
line. 245 Madison repeated his request and again the local officials
approved the request only to be overturned by the state agency.246
In August of 2001, after this second reversal Madison filed an
RLUIPA claim in federal court.
The background of Madison is instructive for several
reasons. Factually, it is very similar to the majority of RLUIPA
prisoner claims. Therefore, this scenario is likely to be played out
across the country. Second, it is one of the first significant
challenges to RLUIPA's constitutionality. 247 It is also one of the
few cases that actually held RLUIPA unconstitutional.248 Finally,
Madison, even though it concerns prisoners' rights, reflects many
242

See generally Rabbi Yaakov Luban, Kosher Q & A, Union of Orthodox
Jewish Congregations of America, July 18, 2003 (detailing Kosherate law
at
available
Diet),
the
Kosher
and
http://www.ou.org/kosher/kosherqa/food.htm (last accessed July 1, 2003)
Kosher law has been adjudicated in the courts before and found
unconstitutional. Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats v. Rubin, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), affd 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002).

243 Id.
244 Id.
245 id.
246 id.
247

248

Almost every municipal defendant has tried and failed to challenge
Only one other court has explicitly held
RLUIPA's constitutionality.
RLUIPA's prisoner protections unconstitutional, Al Ghashiyah v. Wis. Dept.
of Corr., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003). Other prisoner cases that
have upheld RLUIPA include Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (Cal.
2002); Mayweathers v. Terhune, 2001 WL 504140 (E.D. Cal); Johnson v.
Martin, 223 F. Supp.2d 820 (W.D. Mich. 2002); Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.
Supp.2d 955 (W.D. Wis. 2002); Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp.2d 827
(S.D. Ohio 2002).
For a list of cases that have upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA, see Brief
of Amicus Curiae of various Religious and Civil Rights organizations in
at
03-6362)
at
6-7,
Madison (No.
of Appellants
support
http://www.rluipa.com/cases/Madison-amicus.pdf (last accessed July 1,
2003).
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of the same concerns that are often claims in challenging the
validity of RLUIPA in zoning cases as well.249 Since Judge Turk's
decision in Madison, several circuits have weighed in on the
Constitutionality of RLUIPA's prisoner aspect. For instance,
relying heavily on Judge Turk's opinion, the 6 th Circuit specifically
held that "RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause because it
favors religious rights over other fundamental rights without any
showing that religious rights are at any greater risk of
deprivation.250
The ruling in Madison is exceptional for several reasons.
First, the ruling was specifically limited to only prisoner cases. "In
this opinion, the Court addresses ...the section of RLUIPA
pertaining to institutionalized persons and not the portions of
RLUIPA dealing with zoning laws." 251 The court took no notice or
examination of RLUIPA as it relates to zoning ordinances except
to note that other circuits have upheld the constitutionality of
"The Defendants claim that RLUIPA exceeds
RLUIPA.
Congress's authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses,
and violates the Tenth Amendment, Establishment Clause, and the
Separation of Powers. The defendants' claims have been rejected
by the few courts that have reviewed the constitutionality of
252 Madison is indicative of the few cases in which
RLUIPA."
found unconstitutional. Madison, like the other
RLUIPA has been

249

See Hale E Kaula v. Maui Planning Comm'n. 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D.Hi.
2002); see also Marci Hamilton, Struggling With Churche As Neighbors:
Land Use Conflicts Between Religious Institutions And Those Who Reside
at
2002),
17,
(Jan.
11
Nearby,
(last accessed
http://writ.corporate.fmdlaw.com/hamilton/20020117.html
July 2, 2003), stating "Unfortunately, whereas negotiations over land use
used to include fair consideration of neighbors' concems, RLUIPA has now

slanted those negotiations sharply in favor of religious institutions. The
statute is not only unfair, it is also unconstitutional ..." Professor Hamilton is
the Paul R. Verkuil Professor of Public Law at the Benjamin Cardozo School
of Law. Professor Hamilton represented the City of Boeme in Boerne v.

Flores before the Supreme Court. She has spoken extensively before
Congress on the role of religious organization in public policy. Professor's
at
available
is
information
biographical
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/facultystaff/fulltime.html

250

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 2003 FED App. 0397P, 9 (6th Cir. 2003).
F.Supp.2d at 570.

211 Madison, 240
252

Id.
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examples cited by the complainants, are all prisoner litigation
claims.
The second reason Madison is exceptional is the robustness
of Judge Turk's opinion. According to the opinion, the effect of
RLUIPA in prisoner cases was to place religion above other
fundamental rights in that a claim under RLUIPA required strict
scrutiny of religious speech, whereas a claim under another
fundamental right (e.g. association, or speech), does not get strict
scrutiny review in prisoner cases. Therefore, "[w]ith due respect to
the courts that have found RLUIPA constitutional, this Court is of
the opinion that RLUIPA's application of the Sherbert strict
scrutiny standard to the free exercise claims of religious inmates is
a clear violation of the Establishment Clause, having the primary
253
effect of advancing religion above other fundamental rights."
For reasons of security, a prisoner is not allowed all of the
same rights afforded to a civilian. "The 'obvious' security
problems that the Court referred to included possible drug and
weapon smuggling into the prison., 254 This has been repeatedly
255
reinforced by the Supreme Court. 25 In 1987, the Court handed
down the test to determine the reasonableness of a prison
regulation that impinges on a prisoner's constitutional rights. The
Court provided a rational relationship test that had four factors.
The first required a "valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to
Second, there had to be "alternative means of
justify it.,, 256
that remain open to prison inmates." 257 The
the
right
exercising
third required the court to assess "the impact accommodation of
the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other
2 58
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally."
Finally, the court was to look at "the absence of ready alternatives"
253 Id.
254

Owen Rarric, Comment, Kirsch v. Department of Corrections. Will the

255

Supreme Court Say "Hands Off" Again?, 35 AKRON L. REV. 305, 308
(2002).
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

257

520 (1979).
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468
U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.

258

Id.

256

194
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to the challenged prison regulation. 259 The Court set up this
rational relationship test in realization that "[1]awful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system., 260 The Court has gone even further
to note that deference be given to the judgments of prison
administrators. "In considering the appropriate balance of these
factors, we have often said that evaluation of penological
objectives is committed to the considered judgment of prison
in the
administrators, 'who are actually charged with and trained
26
running of the particular institution under examination.' 1
RLUIPA infringed upon this standard. Whereas before,
any infringement of a First Amendment right only required the
government to show a rational relationship between the goal and
262
the rule, RLUIPA required a strict scrutiny level of review.
"The principal and primary effect of RLUIPA is to advance
religion by elevating religious rights above all other fundamental
It is at this point that RLUIPA was found
rights. 263
unconstitutional. Judge Turk put his entire opinion very simply,
"Before RLUIPA, the deference in OLone and Turner to the
decisions of prison administrators applied equally to all claims
based on the violation of fundamental rights including, among
others, free speech claims ... ,,264 But once RLUIPA became law it
"single[d] out religious rights from the fundamental rights
encompassed within the Turner test and establish[ed] a drastically
,,265
The extra
increased level of protection for such rights.
protection that religion is given over other fundamental rights, such
as speech, assembly, or association, became the law's fundamental
flaw. In the court's reasoning, this increased level of protection
that religion is given serves to advance religion over other rights.
"The singling out of religious belief as the one fundamental right
of prisoners deserving of legislative protection rejects any notion
259
260
261

262
263
264
261

id.

Price, 334 U.S. at 285.
O'lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2003).
Madison, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 574-75.
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of congressional neutrality in the passage of RLUIPA., 266 As
Professor Hamilton has stated, "It's a perfect weapon because it
threatens a lengthy and expensive lawsuit. It is leverage that
nobody else has." 267 The decision at the district court level in

Madison is a perfect illustration of Hamilton's sentiment.
Unfortunately for Professor Hamilton, and Judge Turk,
certain rights are deliberately intended to give leverage that no one
else has. These are enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The 4th Circuit
realized this extra level of protection and overruled Judge Turk on
December 8, 2003.

268

The question of whether RLUIPA is

constitutional was certified to the 4 th Circuit Court of Appeals
where the circuit rejected Judge Turk's Lemon analysis:
Evidence of the impermissible government of
advancement of religion includes 'sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in the religious

activity'

....

Here,

however Congress has not sponsored religion or
become actively involved in religious activity, and
RLUIPA is in no way trying to indoctrinate
prisoners in any particular belief or to advance
religion in general in the prisoners.269
Most notably the circuit held "[w]hile RLUIPA's scope may be in
some ways broader than the specific religious exceptions that the
Supreme Court has previously upheld, the central principle - that
Congress may legitimately minimize government burdens on
here has acted
religious exercise - remains the same. Congress
270
purpose."
secular
this
properly in embracing
According to Judge Turk, RLUIPA was an unlawful
usurpation of the power of prison officials. It not only removed
the necessary deference that officials are given, but it advanced
religion over other fundamental rights. The strict scrutiny that
RLUIPA requires set it apart from the rubric of constitutionality.
Id. at 576.
267 Dam Report, supra note 1 (quoting Prof. Marci Hamilton).
268 Madison v. Riter, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24629, 16-17 (4 h Cir. 2003).
266

269

I. at 16.

270

Id. at 15.
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However, now that the 4 th Circuit has reversed, RLUIPA is fully
within the realm of constitutionality. Because of the conservative
RLUIPA prisoner claims
nature of the circuit, it is likely that27other
1
will fall in line behind the decision.

271

In Charles v. Verhagen, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 22297 (7th Cir. Oct. 30,
2003), the 7 th Circuit upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA only a few
days prior to the 6th Circuit's decision: The requirements of RLUIPA cannot
fairly be said to amount to government advancement of religion through the
government's own activities or influence. RLUIPA seeks to remove only the
most substantial burdens States impose upon prisoners' religious rights,
while giving States' penological interests due consideration. id. at 20. The
case that has garnered the most attention in recent RLUIPA memory has
been Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 ( 9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2002),
because it was the first case to be affected by the Supreme Court. In a
prisoner claim, the 9 h Circuit held RLUIPA to be a constitutional exercise of
Congress's power. The state appealed the decision to the Supreme Court but
the writ of certiorari was denied in October 2003. Alameida v.
Mayweathers, 72 U.S.L.W. 3235 (2003).
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VII. CONCLUSION
RLUIPA is a powerful tool for the proper plaintiff.
Religious beliefs are so central and salient to a person's being that
any violation of those rights is substantive and likely actionable
under RLUIPA. When utilized successfully a party can effectively
achieve what other plaintiffs could not - zoning autonomy.
RLUIPA was not designed to be the 'elephant in the room,' the
legislation that everyone knows is present, but refuses to talk
about. It is to be used early and often to protect the public from
Constitutional violations the courts seemed hesitant to restrain.
Instead it was designed to protect the fundamental rights that were
granted to all Americans in the First Amendment. RLUIPA is a
very effective shield when used successfully.
RLUIPA's robustness in the face of numerous challenges
has been no accident. The framers of the law purposely designed it
so that it would withstand legal challenge. From a zoning context
RLUIPA has done just that. By parsing RLUIPA through
numerous Constitutional provisions, by documenting the
discrimination that was prevalent in society, and by creating a
narrow focus that only serves to place religion on the same playing
field as other rights, Congress has drafted a robust and so far
challenge-proof piece of zoning legislation. But there are chinks in
the armor, as the 3 and 9th Circuits have demonstrated. Where
RLUIPA claims go from here is anyone's guess.
The decisions in the prisoner cases have been much more
variable and, consequently, the case law differs. Madison v. Riter
is illustrative of the RLUIPA cases involving prisoners. Within the
prisoner framework, RLUIPA has not survived every challenge. In
fact, appeals are pending in several circuits as this note is being
written. The crux of the debate is whether RLUIPA places religion
over other fundamental rights that the prison system has a right to
restrict. The outcome in the 4 th Circuit this May will be very
telling for future RLUIPA cases. Did Madison's district court
ruling stem the tide of RLUIPA's constitutionality, or was its
reversal in the 4th Circuit an illustration of the robustness of the
law? Only when the Supreme Court decides will there be any
certainty.

